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LAWYERS, LAW, AND CONTRACT 
FORMATION 
Comments on Daniel Keating's 
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action' 
Robert K. Rasmussen* 
Attempting to infuse the austerity of theory with a dose of reality, 
an intrepid group of legal scholars has left the security of the office 
and ventured into the work-a-day world of commercial practices. The 
information that they have gathered and are sharing with the rest of us 
is furthering our understanding of the interaction between commercial 
law and commercial practice. Embedded in much of the research they 
have generated is the not-so-flattering conclusion that law professors 
suffer from a self-serving bias. Those of us in the academy engage in 
the assumption, often unstated or even unacknowledged, that the law 
significantly affects the behavior of parties to a contract. This belief in 
the force of law applies to all aspects of the contracting process: con­
tract formation, contract interpretation, and the remedies available af­
ter a contract has been breached. This assumption of the importance 
of law enhances the status of commercial law professors in that it 
makes what we teach, and by implication us, important. 
The easy link between statutes and cases - law on the books -
and actual contracting practice - law in action - has been strained 
severely, if not shattered, by the various studies that have been pro­
duced so far, both in this Symposium and elsewhere. The stated goal 
of the recent empirical research in commercial law is to provide a 
richer understanding of the forces that shape transactions between 
private parties, with this understanding often being that law is less im­
portant than we may have thought before. While various researchers 
are using differing methodologies to examine commercial practice, 
one especially fruitful course of inquiry is to talk to the participants in 
the actual transactions. As an illustration, consider Professor Dan 
Keating's excellent contribution to this Symposium.1 Professor 
Keating explores the role that standardized forms play in contracting 
behavior by talking to both buyers and sellers of goods. This method-
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1982, Loyola (Chicago); J.D. 1985, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. I would like to thank John Goldberg and Alan Schwartz for 
helpful comments on an earlier version of these comments. 
1. See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2678 (2000). 
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ology traces back at least to Stewart Macaulay's famous study of busi­
ness practices in Wisconsin.2 The picture drawn by these "law in ac­
tion" pieces enriches our understanding of commercial law, with the 
conclusion inevitably being that one cannot ascertain the way in which 
private parties contract between themselves by simply reading the ap­
plicable state-supplied legal rules. One has to talk to the players in­
volved. 
As Karl Llewellyn urged long ago, studies such as these serve as an 
important corrective to the natural academic tendency toward solip­
sism. We cannot simply assume that the statutes and cases that we 
teach provide a direct view into contracting behavior. In this caution­
ary tale for law teachers, there may also be a cautionary tale for em­
pirical legal research. For there is no reason to believe that law pro­
fessors have a monopoly on self-serving biases. Probably most of us 
have a need to view ourselves ill a positive, if in fact unrealistic, way.3 
This tendency suggests that we should be careful about extrapolating 
from research that relies on interviews with commercial parties about 
their perceptions of commercial practice.4 In particular, we might 
worry that the information received reflects the natural bias toward 
self-importance among those people to whom the researchers have 
spoken.5 Recognizing the existence of the bias need not lessen the 
value of this research. Rather, a skeptical treatment of the informa-
tion received can actually enhance its value. -
There are at least three ways in which the self-importance bias may 
affect the lessons that should be drawn from this body of work. The 
first is that bias will affect the importance that commercial actors will 
attach to law. Based on the general tendency of everyone to inflate 
their own importance, nonlawyers would be less likely to acknowledge 
the law as an important part of their calculus, whereas lawyers would 
be more likely to do so. It is not that either nonlawyers or lawyers 
have a preferred perspective on the "true" state of affairs; rather, it is 
that law is the province of lawyers, and thus, lawyers will be more 
likely to perceive an important role for law in any given transaction 
2 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55 (1963). 
3. See Albert Bandura, Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory, 44 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1175, 1175-79 (1989); Jeff Greenberg et al., Why Do People Need Self­
Esteem? Converging Evidence That Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety-Buffering Function, 63 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 913, 920 (1992). 
4. Not all of the recent empirical research in co=ercial law has relied on such inter­
views. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000) (relying on banking documents); Robert K. Rasmussen & Ran­
dall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000) (relying on bankruptcy court filings). 
5. See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 
854-60 (1995). 
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than would nonlawyers. Nonlawyers, on the other hand, presumably 
would emphasize those attributes of the transaction for which they 
have a comparative advantage. 
There is a second way that the recognition of a self-serving bias on 
the part of those interviewed can add to what we learn from those in­
terviews. The differing perceptions of lawyers and nonlawyers pro­
vides a glimpse into the workings of the firm. A standard criticism of 
economics - which can be extended to much of the empirical work on 
commercial law as well - is that it too often ignores how decisions are 
made inside a firm. A firm is treated as a "black box" that makes the 
value-maximizing decision. But information gathered from the field 
suggests that law can be a way for lawyers inside a firm to, at the mar­
gin, increase their status within the firm. In-house counsel can ad­
vance their position by emphasizing the importance of law, whereas 
others in the firm may find it in their interest to downplay law's sig­
nificance. To the extent that this is true, decisions by firms may not 
represent the optimal weighing of costs and benefits sometimes im­
plied in the literature, but rather reflect the outcome of an internal 
struggle for power and prestige. 
Finally, the likely presence of bias in descriptions of how commer­
cial actors work complicates the normative stance we should take to­
ward participants' views of proposed changes in the law. The promise 
of seeking the wisdom of those in the field is that they can provide in­
valuable "situation sense" in assessing the likely impact of proposed 
reform.6 The possibility of bias, however, makes it difficult to credit 
these observations uncritically. Indeed, the extent to which law re­
form efforts should take account of bias is a difficult question. On the 
one hand, bias may call into question the accuracy of some statements 
about the efficacy of a proposed change. On the other, it may lead to 
a resistance to embrace change, which would be a true cost in at­
tempting to move toward a better legal regime. 
Professor Keating's work on the battle of the forms provides an 
excellent vehicle for exploring these issues. His article is itself a wor­
thy addition to the growing empirical research on commercial law; it 
tackles one of the staples of the law school curriculum, section 2-207 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). At the same time, it pro­
vides concrete examples of how the bias of those interviewed may af­
fect the vision of "law in action" that one receives. Whereas the re­
searchers in other studies have spoken either primarily or exclusively 
with nonlawyers, Professor Keating deals primarily with lawyers. Pro­
fessor Keating examines the contracting behavior of twenty-five firms. 
6. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 
268-85 (1960). For an excellent discussion of "situation sense" and its relation to practical 
reasoning, see Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, 
and the Rule of Law, 45 V AND. L. REV. 533 (1992). 
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For nineteen of these firms, the information comes from lawyers.7 
This predominance of lawyers in the data set, as compared with the 
lack of lawyers in other reports, provides an opportunity to examine 
how the respective biases of lawyers and nonlawyers may affect con­
clusions about the impact of law in the work-a-day world. 
One can readily understand why Professor Keating selected sec­
tion 2-207 as the basis for his empirical study. Section 2-207's legen­
dary opacity makes it an ideal doctrinal "nut" to crack: a contracts 
professor's dream, and a nightmare for students. 
On first reading, one may be tempted to view Professor Keating's 
findings as consistent with other empirical work questioning the effect 
of legal rules in the real world. Indeed, Professor Keating's empirical 
research has shown that commercial practice has fared much better at 
surviving the thicket of section 2-207 than has the average law student. 
Many firms, Professor Keating reports, avoid engaging in a battle of 
the forms in the first instance, and those that do rarely become in­
volved in disputes.8 Moreover, such disputes that arise are, by and 
large, settled amicably. From this description it would be a short step 
to conclude that section 2-207 may serve the purposes of pedagogy, 
while it does not affect actual commercial practice. 
While Professor Keating's research calls into question the number 
of times that section 2-207 may have to be invoked in order to flesh 
out a contract, there is a way in which his findings suggest a larger role 
for law than do other studies. By way of contrast, consider the article 
by Professor Lisa Bernstein presented at this symposium.9 In her 
study of the cotton industry, Professor Bernstein finds law to be a dis­
tant, barely visible force. Not only has the cotton industry created a 
private legal system apart from the U.C.C., but the buyers and sellers 
in the cotton industry do not even act much in the shadow of this pri­
vate legal system. Professor Bernstein's examinations of other indus­
tries have reached similar conclusions.10 Yet for those to whom Pro­
fessor Keating spoke, the law seems more immediate. For example, 
the decision of many sellers to enter into what Professor Keating 
terms a "fully dickered" contract is a decision that acknowledges the 
existence of law. It represents a decision to spend the time necessary 
to reach assent as to how certain future contingencies will be handled 
7. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2693. 
8. Professor Macaulay reached similar conclusions. See Macualay, supra note 2, at 59-60 
(of 16 sales managers interviewed, 7 reported that they did not engage in a battle of the 
forms). 
9. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001). 
10. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opt­
ing Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
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as opposed to relying on the terms that the law would apply were 
there to be divergent forms. Professor Keating reports that sellers of­
ten worried about being stuck with the U.C.C.'s default rule on conse­
quential damages. Those who represented buyers, in contrast, were 
willing to rest on forms because of their comfort with the gap fillers 
provided by the U.C.C. Needless to say, these are determinations 
driven by the extant legal rules. Indeed, none of those interviewed 
seems to have expressed ignorance about section 2-207 or to have 
failed to think about the battle of the forms question. 
It is of course possible that the attention paid to the law by Profes­
sor Keating's sources, as opposed to the lack of attention paid to the 
law by the sources in other studies, may be due to the fact that the 
sources worked in different industries in each study. It may be that 
contracting behavior in some industries is shaped by legal rules, while 
in others it is governed by nonlegal norms. There very well could be a 
heterogeneity of approaches to contract formation. Admittedly, there 
is no firm basis in the current empirical work for rejecting this hy­
pothesis. There is no evidence that Professor Keating's subjects 
worked in the same industries as those studied by other researchers. 
Yet I want to suggest another possible explanation. The fact that Pro­
fessor Keating spoke primarily to lawyers may have magnified the im­
portance of law in the answers that he received. 
The defining characteristic of lawyers is that they are experts in the 
law. Legal training provides lawyers with a set of skills and norms that 
supports a distinct professional identity. People in general tend to 
perceive the world in ways that increase their own status and impor­
tance.11 For lawyers, this tendency could cause them to attach height­
ened importance to the law. The more that the law can affect a given 
transaction, the more that the lawyer is needed to ensure that the 
transaction proceeds without a hitch. Professor Keating's study, which 
is replete with references to law, arguably provides evidence to this ef­
fect. 
The lessons for interpreting the data obtained by empirical re­
searchers are twofold. First, we may be entitled to assume that studies 
relying predominately on the reporting of nonlawyers systematically 
understates the effect that law has on transactional behavior. Non­
lawyers know that law is not their domain. To the extent that they 
perceive law as affecting their transaction, they are in effect acknowl­
edging that they are not in complete control of the situation. They are 
ceding power to others. Such an admission would tend to threaten 
their egos and thus may be suppressed. This implies that we should 
hesitate before we fully credit studies, based on reports from the field, 
which find that law has little to no effect on real world behavior. Sec-
11. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role 
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 375, 428-30 (1997). 
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ond, it may be that interviews with lawyers result in overstating the 
importance of law. 
Perhaps the most notable example of this difference in perspective 
in Professor Keating's piece occurs when he explains why he ended up 
speaking primarily with lawyers. He notes that, in conducting his in­
terviews, "the most useful interviews seemed to be with in-house 
counsel ... ," while "[b]usiness people� .. often lack the richness ... 
of the in-house counse1.m2 I take the "richness" to which Professor 
Keating refers as being that lawyers have a more detailed explanation 
of how they handle the problems raised by section 2-207, the subject of 
his study. The lawyers, apparently, have thought about this problem a 
lot, whereas the nonlawyers have not. 
One can find a similar difference in perception between lawyers 
and nonlawyers in Professor Macaulay's article. He reported that 
"lawyers ... said businessmen often commit their firms to significant 
exchanges too casually .... ".13 In the same vein, Professor Macaulay 
found "that businessman are least concerned about planning their 
transactions so that they are legally enforceable contracts."14 In short, 
lawyers focus on the legal aspects of transactions; businessmen do not. 
This difference in focus raises important and underresearched 
questions about how these differences are resolved inside firms. Most 
large firms contain both nonlawyers and lawyers. After all, while Pro­
fessor Keating and other individuals speak with individuals, ulti­
mately, it is the firm that becomes a party to the contract. Professor 
Keating's work sheds light on how decisions in a firm may be reached. 
Rightly understood, Professor Keating and those to whom he 
spoke discuss the general question of contract negotiation. Specifi­
cally, they address the decision as to the level of resources that should 
be invested in contract negotiations. Each party to a potential transac­
tion has to decide what level of resources to spend on negotiating the 
contract. An ideal contract - what the economists call a fully contin­
gent contract - specifies the rights each party would have against the 
other under all possible future contingencies. Given the limits of hu­
man foresight, such contracts do not exist. Rather, contracts are often 
incomplete.15 
A somewhat more attainable goal is what Professor Keating calls a 
"fully dickered " contract. In this contract, both parties knowingly as­
sent to all of its terms. There may be terms that have been uninten­
tionally left out. Moreover, the terms that are actually in the contract 
12. Keating, supra note 1, at 2693. 
13. Macaulay, supra note 2, at 60. 
14. Id. 
15. On the reasons for incomplete contracts and possible approaches to dealing with 
such contracts, see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW P ALGRA VE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 (1998). 
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may not be optimal in that they may not specify the efficient rule in all 
situations. The defining feature of this contract, however, is that there 
is no doubt that each party knowingly has consented to the terms that 
appear in the writings that constitute the contract. Any incomplete­
ness in the contract is due to lack of foresight rather than strategic 
concerns. When a dispute arises, the parties themselves may try to re­
solve their dispute in light of the terms to which they agreed. Cer­
tainly, if the matter rose to the level of litigation, a court would look to 
these agreed-to terms for guidance in reaching a decision. 
At the other extreme of detail, one can imagine contracts in which 
the firms only agree to the basic terms of the deal - price, quantity, 
and delivery. A simple phone call or a trip to the seller may lead to a 
contract where the parties agree to the bare essentials, and neither 
makes any effort to provide the nonimmediate terms of the contract. 
In most cases, the bare essentials complete the transaction, and there 
is no subsequent dispute. For those cases in which a dispute arises, 
courts have to supply a "gap filler" to resolve the dispute. In the case 
of a sale of goods, this gap filler comes from the relevant state's en­
actment of the U.C.C. 
Somewhere between these two extremes of contractual incom­
pleteness lies the battle of the forms. Each firm puts resources into 
drafting or selecting a form to use. It then employs internal mecha­
nisms to ensure that the firm's employees use the form when buying or 
selling goods. The firm, in this situation, thus spends more resources 
than when there simply is an agreement on the major terms. The firm, 
however, does not go to the extreme of trying to reach an agreement 
on the nonimmediate terms covered by the form. When a dispute 
arises in cases falling into this intermediate zone, section 2-207 directs 
a court to the rule of decision. 
Were one to assume that firms are rational, money-maximizing en­
tities, one easily could construct a story by which the firm always 
spends the efficient amount of resources on any given contract. Each 
firm has to choose the level of resources to invest in contractual nego­
tiations. Perhaps the most interesting finding of Professor Keating in 
this regard is the extent to which firms choose not to engage in battles 
of the forms. By my count, at least ten of the twenty-five firms that 
Professor Keating investigates have decided to avoid a battle of the 
forms by insisting on a fully dickered contract.16 The primary reason 
for this decision seems to be economies of scale. The one unifying fac­
tor among these firms is that their transactions involve repeat dealings 
with other firms. 
16. Professor Macaulay reports similar findings. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 59·60 
(of 16 sales managers questioned, 7 stated that they did not engage in transactions which re­
sulted in the exchange of competing forms). 
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One can readily explain why repeated dealings may lead to more 
complete contracts. When two parties are going to engage in basically 
the same transaction over and over, the cost of agreeing on the non­
immediate terms is fixed. The nonimmediate terms to which the par­
ties would agree do not vary based on any individual transaction. The 
value-maximizing provision on consequential damages or warranties is 
the same in the first transaction as in the hundredth transaction. The 
parties merely have to agree on that term. The cost of reaching such 
an agreement does not turn on the number of transactions between 
the two parties. Put simply, the cost of agreement on nonimmediate 
terms is a fixed cost. 
The cost of not agreeing on nonimmediate terms, however, turns 
on a variety of factors: the number of transactions that the parties will 
engage in, the amount at stake in any subsequent dispute, and the 
likelihood that such a dispute will arise. Each transaction for which 
the parties do not take the time to reach an agreement on the nonim­
mediate terms carries with it a risk that a dispute will arise later that 
will be resolved by something other than the parties' agreement. As 
the number of transactions increases, the cost of nonagreement in­
creases. Thus, the cost of not agreeing on nonimmediate terms in this 
setting is a variable cost. 
At some point, this variable cost of failing to specify nonimmediate 
terms will exceed the cost of creating a fully dickered agreement, and 
the parties will find it in their interest to agree on the nonimmediate 
terms. Professor Keating's description of the evolution of contractual 
practices demonstrates that, as one lowers the cost of contracting, par­
ties are more likely to contract for the terms that they determine are in 
their joint interest.17 For those firms that have not completely opted 
out of the battle of the forms, those in charge of contracting use their 
"situation sense" to identify those transactions where the gains pro­
vided by a fully dickered contract exceed the cost of obtaining one.18 
All is well and good. 
The story becomes more complicated, and less Panglosian, when 
we look at how a firm may make a contracting decision. At least in 
the cases where lawyers have input into the decisionmaking process, it 
may well be that firms are too quick to engage in detailed negotia­
tions. Inside a firm, there is a basic struggle among various actors for 
influence and prestige. This struggle can come from a number of 
17. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2713-14 (predicting as retailers become larger, they will 
be more likely to opt for a fully dickered contract). 
18. See id. at 2698: 
[C]ompanies tended to take an ad hoc approach that considered various factors that would 
weigh in favor of doing a truly integrated contract: the overall size of the deal, the likelihood 
that a particular buyer-seller relationship would end up being long-term, the reputation of 
the company on the other side, and any risk that was perceived to be unusual. 
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sources. Perhaps it is each individual actor's need to portray herself as 
essential to the mission of the firm. Perhaps it is simply that the 
higher-up actors have a budget constraint in terms of the time that 
they can devote to the firm, and it thus behooves those below to com­
pete against each other for attention. Regardless of the animating 
cause, each actor has to make a claim that she provides an essential 
service. 
This give and take over importance is not confined to the higher 
reaches of a firm's management. Every person in a firm, regardless of 
where she is on the firm's hierarchy, has an incentive to overstate her 
importance. The battle of the forms problem illustrates this point. 
The question of choosing between a battl� of the forms and a fully 
dickered contract is unlikely to occupy the attention of a firm's Board 
of Directors or even highly placed members of the management team. 
The general point is that, regardless of where inside the firm the deci­
sion is made, lawyers will have a tendency to highlight legal risks, and 
nonlawyers will have a tendency to downplay such risks. 
In this battle for importance within the firm, the optimal strategy 
for in-house counsel is clear. The more legal problems that arise and 
that they can solve, the more their status increases. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that corporate counsel often have an incentive to over­
state legal risk as a way to enhance their prestige inside the firm.19 Of 
course, in-house counsel cannot overplay their hand. Legal risks can­
not be too great, or too unmanageable; otherwise, outside counsel may 
be called in. In-house counsel, thus, have to acknowledge both the 
importance of law - so as to tout their superiority over mere business 
people - and the importance of the actual business - so as to main­
tain a comparative advantage over outside counsel. In the case of the 
battle of the forms, this strategy could take the form of deciding too 
early that detailed negotiations are necessary. Detailed negotiations 
that focus on nonimmediate terms are the province of lawyers. Non­
lawyers are quite adept at negotiating over price, quantity, and date of 
delivery. Lawyers, however, have a comparative advantage in wran­
gling over terms such as warranty and consequential damages. The 
more important these nonimmediate terms loom in a transaction, the 
more important the lawyer's input becomes. 
To be sure, the nonlawyers in the firm have a countervailing incen­
tive not to credit the importance of legal terms. Whereas lawyers find 
it in their interest to overstate the importance of law, nonlawyers 
would benefit by understating it.20 At the level of theory, one cannot 
19, See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 415-16, 
20. A similar situation seems to occur in relations to Electronic Data Interchange 
agreements. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2713-14 ("[M]ost companies do not also use [the 
negotiation of an EDI agreement] to work out the general terms and conditions of the sale 
beyond the issues surrounding the electronic mode of communication."). 
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say with confidence that these effects tend to balance each other out, 
or that one is stronger than the other. Indeed, the answer may vary 
from firm to firm. 
The one piece of evidence that suggests that firms may overinvest 
in contractual negotiations is the paucity of litigation after disputes 
arise. Both Professor Keating and Professor Macaulay found that con­
tract litigation over the battle of the forms is not a frequent occur­
rence.21 Both report that disputes generally are worked out without 
resort to legal process. The salient difference between expenditures 
on contract negotiation and those on litigation is that, after the fact, it 
is easier to measure whether the expenditures were cost-justified in 
the litigation setting. After litigation, a manager overseeing in-house 
counsel can readily compare litigation's costs with its returns. Such an 
easy analysis is not available for funds spent on contractual negotia­
tions. There is always a plausible claim that the expenditures pre­
vented future problems. Thus, it may be easier for lawyers inside a 
firm to make excessive expenditures on contractual negotiations than 
on contractual litigation. 
In sum, once we take into account self-importance bias, the happy 
story that firms make optimal decisions regarding when to engage in a 
battle of forms and when to contract out of such a fight may not be 
true. The decision as to the amount of resources to spend on the 
nonimmediate terms to a contract may represent, instead, the outcome 
of a battle between lawyers and nonlawyers inside the firm for a con­
tract. This observation is meant neither as a criticism of those who fo­
cus on lawyers or those who do not. Rather, it is simply one of cau­
tion. Firms, no less than the people who comprise them, are complex. 
In looking for the effect of law, we should remember that we do not 
receive unbiased statements from the front. Rather, we get perception 
filtered through life experiences. 
Typically, the empirical literature on commercial law tends to offer 
two possible justifications for contracts: they increase efficiency or 
they enable monopoly.22 In either situation, the firm is acting ration­
ally. It is entering into a contract that provides value to the firm. 
Looking inside the firm, however, suggests a third reason for the level 
of contractual completeness: it is a victory by the attorneys for status. 
21. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2696; Macaulay, supra note 2, at 61-62. While Profes· 
sor Keating notes that there is little litigation over section 2·207, Macaulay notes that there is 
little contract litigation as a general matter. The one thing that we do not know is, in those 
situations in which litigation over a contract occurs, how often does it involve section 2·207 
as opposed to some other basis for dispute. 
22. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunc· 
t/onal Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2423 (2000). 
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The more legal issues that have to be negotiated and resolved, the 
more important the lawyers become.23 
Perhaps one of the more novel aspects of Professor Kea ting's study 
is that he not only inquires into current contracting practices, but he 
also asks his subjects about their reactions to potential changes in the 
governing rules. He finds that those he asks, while intrigued by the 
proposals offered by academics, generally do not favor their enact­
ment. They are comfortable with the status quo, despite the wide­
spread academic criticism of section 2-207. 
The question becomes what normative stance should we take to­
wards this information. Many academics have suggested changes in 
the law, often radical changes. This is true in almost all areas of the 
law, not just section 2-207. Indeed, I would imagine that one would be 
hard pressed to find a single legal rule that some academic has not 
taken issue with except, perhaps, the Thirteenth Amendment. In a 
world full of proposals for change, what should be the role of profes­
sional resistance to these changes? 
On the one hand, it may be that those engaged in the daily practice 
of commerce have a better perspective on reform than do legal com­
mentators. Those on the ground can, drawing on their intuitions 
honed over a number of years, provide insight as to whether a new 
approach offers the prospect of beneficial change. They can anticipate 
how commercial actors would or would not change their behavior 
based on a change in the governing legal rule. They have what Karl 
Llewellyn called "situation sense.'.z4 In the contract arena, they know 
that, contrary to Professor Goldberg, having a court choose the better 
form will insert the views of an outsider unschooled in the practical 
needs of business. They also can discern, contrary to Professors Baird 
and Weisberg, that having the last form govern will cause more prob­
lems than exist under the current regime. 
On the other hand, resistance to change may reflect other factors. 
The lawyers with whom Professor Keating spoke may, like most peo­
ple, have a bias towards the status quo.25 Literature from behavioral 
economics suggests that parties are too wedded to the way things cur-
23. This notion of lawyers using law to improve their status in a firm gives one pause 
before accepting entirely the description of lawyers as "transaction cost engineers." See gen­
erally, Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE LJ. 239 {1984); Symposium: Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74 
OR. L. REV. 1 {1995). 
24. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6. 
25. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. 
Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Win­
ter 1991, at 193. One largely unexplored issue is the extent to which firm structure can 
dampen the effect of this and other cognitive biases. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral 
Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 V AND. 
L. REV. 1679, 1687-90 (1998). 
August 2000] Lawyers, Law, and Contract Formation 2759 
rently are. If this is the case, then those with whom Professor Keating 
spoke may have underestimated the beneficial effect that a substantial 
reform of section 2-207 could provide. 
Somewhat more problematic, as suggested above, is that the 
Byzantine provisions of section 2-207 may have inadvertently given 
lawyers power in their relationships with others inside the firm. In­
deed, this power may explain the lawyers' resistance to proposals such 
as the one offered by Professors Baird and Weisberg. These lawyers 
stated that they like the uncertainty of current law. This taste for un­
certainty may flow from the fact that uncertainty raises the status of 
lawyers within the firm. When a dispute over a transaction arises, the 
nonlawyers have to turn to the lawyers for guidance. 
Note that this explanation can also shed light on their response to 
Professor Goldberg's proposal. Professor Goldberg's proposal ulti­
mately allows the judge to pick the form that is more fair. This proce­
dure would decrease the role of the lawyers. Indeed, the in-house 
counsel to whom Professor Keating spoke objected to Professor 
Goldberg's proposal precisely because it would put too much control 
in the hands of a judge. Unstated is the corollary that it takes too 
much power out of the lawyers' hands. 
Yet, even if resistance to change is based on a desire to maintain 
status (or the status quo) rather than on an accurate prediction of the 
merits of a proposed reform, it may be the case that such resistance 
still should counsel against the proposed change. Proponents of re­
form too often implicitly assume compliant actors. The touted bene­
fits materialize because those in the system readily adjust to the new 
set of rules. A preference for the status quo may well impede the op­
eration of the new regime. Passing a reform that will not be embraced 
by those who must implement it may well be a cost of that change. 
Bias may not be justified, but it is nevertheless real. 
CONCLUSION 
The current wave of empirical research undoubtedly enriches our 
understanding of the relationship between legal rules and business de­
cisions. Rather than rely on theoretical models of how people should 
act, it provides us with data on how people do act. But once we substi­
tute the reports of individuals for those of models, we have to be cog­
nizant of the possibility that real people may not be as a candid as 
models in stating how they reached their conclusions. Well­
constructed models specify their underlying assumptions and the rea­
soning process that they use in each step of the analysis. Even the 
more thoughtful of us may be unaware of the biased lens through 
which we see the world. 
